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AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF UNITED STATES V. 
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ABSTRACT 
This article provides a review and analysis of United States v. Jungers and United States 
v. Bonestroo, important court cases providing precedent for charging buyers of sex as 
traffickers in cases involving minors. The decisions in these court cases, and in subsequent 
cases, further solidify the presence of end-demand efforts in the form of prosecution. Yet, 
the decisions in these cases raise additional questions about their implications for state-
level prosecution, the prosecution of buyers in cases involving adults who experience sex 
trafficking, and the buyers of trafficked labor. Drawing from an analysis of relevant cases, 
this article analyzes the impact of United States v. Jungers and United States v. Bonestroo 
on subsequent cases, and argues for the potential of such cases to impact prosecution 
efforts in other facets of human trafficking. 
KEYWORDS 
United States, human trafficking, federal, cases, prosecution, demand, buyers, 
johns, sex trafficking, labor trafficking 
 
ECADES OF RESEARCH show unequal treatment of those who sell sex com-
pared to those who buy it, with those who sell or trade sex more often ar-
rested, fined, and incarcerated (Carmen & Moody, 1985; Fairstein, 1993; 
Lutnik & Cohan, 2009; Maher, 1997; Miller, 1997, 2009; Sanchez, 2001; 
Snyder & Mulako-Wangota, 2015). However, with the growing momentum of anti-
trafficking efforts, a shift is occurring in which buyers of sex are increasingly the 
focus of criminal justice system responses as a means of eradicating sex trafficking.  
 End-demand approaches follow the premise that sex trafficking would not ex-
ist without demand for purchased sex (Ekberg, 2004; Outshoorn, 2005; MacKin-
non, 2005; Madden-Dempsey, 2011; Raymond, 2004; Raymond, Hughes, & 
Gomez, 2001). Similarly, the purchase of trafficked labor by companies and farm-
ers, as well as consumers’ purchase of resulting products, is implicated in labor 
trafficking (Bales & Soodalter, 2009; Heil, 2012). As such, proponents of end-de-
mand efforts contend that demand should be a focal point of anti-trafficking ef-
forts. Gaining popularity in the 90s and 2000s, demand reduction initiatives 
within the criminal justice system generally focus on sex trafficking, and include 
John schools, John shaming programs, and sting operations targeting buyers 
D 
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(Shively et al., 2012; Levine, 2016; Nichols, 2016). More recently, end-demand ef-
forts also include prosecuting buyers as sex traffickers.  
 The court cases United States v. Jungers and United States v. Bonestroo pro-
vided case history and precedent supporting expansion of end-demand efforts 
through prosecution of buyers. In fact, state and federal prosecutors across the 
country are increasingly charging buyers as traffickers; such cases have been suc-
cessfully prosecuted in federal and state courts. Federal legislation continues a 
trend in focusing on prosecuting buyers as traffickers, such the Justice for Victims 
of Trafficking Act (JVTA), which adds a provision for increased funding to law en-
forcement to target buyers. State level legislation also indicates momentum in end-
demand approaches, such as increased accountability for buyers in various state 
Safe Harbor laws and California’s Combat Human Trafficking Act. Yet, the out-
comes of United States v. Jungers and United States v. Bonestroo hold broader 
implications that are little-discussed in the academic and public discourse. Specif-
ically, the cases raise important questions about interpretations of the law and 
their applicability in labor trafficking cases, as well as cases involving trafficked 
adults.  
 The aim of this article is not to focus on whether end-demand efforts are effec-
tive (see Shively et al., 2012 for an overview) or their negative latent consequences 
(see Lutnick, 2016 and Musto, 2016 for overviews), but to explore the implications 
of two important precedent-setting cases on prosecution efforts. Drawing from  an 
overview and analysis of United States v. Jungers and United States v. Bonestroo, 
the aim of this article is threefold:  to analyze the implications of these cases for 
charging buyers as traffickers in 1) labor trafficking cases, 2) cases involving adults, 
and 3) state prosecution of sex trafficking.  
Court Case Precedent 
The Jungers and Bonestroo cases were the first cases that involved charging 
buyers as sex traffickers where the defendants challenged their classification as sex 
traffickers. Cases preceding United States v. Jungers and United States v. 
Bonestroo which charged buyers as traffickers included seven cases successfully 
prosecuted in the Western District of Missouri, initially uncovered through a sting 
operation conducted by undercover officers who posted sex-for-sale ads online.  
The men who responded and attempted to purchase sex with a minor were ar-
rested and charged with sex trafficking (Broughton, 2013; Vardaman & Raino, 
2013). Another case preceded the Jungers and Bonestroo cases. United States v. 
Strevell involved an online sting operation in which Strevell believed he was com-
municating with a Costa Rican travel agency to make arrangements to have sex 
with two girls, ages 14 and 15, on a Costa Rican resort (United States v. Strevell, 
2006).  
However, these cases did not adequately set precedent for the Jungers and 
Bonestroo cases because the charges of sex trafficking were not challenged by the 
defendants, as the buyers in these cases pled guilty and did not contest the charges 
(United States v. Jungers, 2013; United States v. Bonestroo, 2013; Vardaman & 
Raino, 2013). Consequently, the decisions in United States v. Jungers and United 
States v. Bonestroo were important, as they provided a case history which included 
charging buyers as sex traffickers, defendants contesting the charge, and resulting 
case precedent. 
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Similar to the cases prosecuted in the Western District of Missouri and United 
States v. Strevell, Jungers and Bonestroo were initially arrested and convicted of 
sex trafficking as buyers of commercial sex involving minors as a result of a sting 
operation (Vardaman & Raino, 2013). The cases were distinct as, except for the 
cases described above, the individuals prosecuted as sex traffickers in previous 
cases were exclusively pimps, brothel owners, or other third-party profiteers. The 
officers conducting the sting operation posted an online advertisement posing as a 
man “offering his girlfriend’s underage daughters for sex while his girlfriend was 
out of town” (United States v. Jungers, 2013; United States v. Bonestroo, 2013). 
Jungers and Bonestroo, in separate incidents, responded to the ads through email 
correspondence, arranging to meet with the “daughters” for sex. Jungers received 
an age-regressed photo of one of the undercover officers, and was informed that 
the “daughter” was aged eleven. Jungers made arrangements to obtain oral sex 
from an eleven-year-old girl for an hour. When he showed up at the house the un-
dercover officers were using and confirmed his intent to pay for this sex act from 
the minor, he was arrested. Similarly, Bonestroo responded to the ad the officers 
posted as well. He also received an age regressed photo of the undercover officer 
posing as twins, and was informed that the two girls he was making the arrange-
ment for sex with were fourteen. Bonestroo proceeded to arrange to have sex with 
the fourteen-year-old twins for an hour (Broughton, 2013). He showed up to the 
house, asked for the twins, and showed the undercover officers the payment—his 
arrest followed. Both Bonestroo and Jungers were charged by the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office in the District of South Dakota with attempted commercial sex trafficking 
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591 and 1594(a).  
According to the U.S. Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA), a severe form 
of human trafficking is defined as: 
▪ a) A commercial sex act induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person 
induced to perform such act has not attained 18 years of age; or  
▪ b) the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person 
for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose 
of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery (TVPA, 
Section 103, 8a and 8b). 
In legal terms, anyone under the age of 18 involved in a commercial sex act, or 
any adult involved in commercial sex who is induced by force, fraud or coercion is 
considered a sex trafficking victim. This definition of a trafficked person has been 
widely and accepted in legal contexts. Yet, the definition of a trafficker has been 
debated in the context of the meaning and clarity of related statutes, with United 
States v. Jungers and United States v. Bonestroo serving as a cornerstone of this 
legal debate. U.S.C § 1591(a) works to provide a definition of a human trafficker in 
the section Sex Trafficking of Children or by Force Fraud or Coercion: 
Whoever knowingly— 
(1) in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or within the special 
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, recruits, entices, 
harbors, transports, provides, obtains, or maintains by any means a per-
son; or (2) benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, from par-
ticipation in a venture which has engaged in an act described in violation 
of paragraph (1),” knowing, or in reckless disregard of the fact, that means 
of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion described in subsection (e)(2), or 
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any combination of such means will be used to cause the person to engage 
in a commercial sex act, or that the person has not attained the age of 18 
years and will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act, shall be pun-
ished as provided in subsection (b). 
Section 1594 makes violation of § 1591 a federal crime. In the cases of 
Bonestroo and Jungers, the defense revolved entirely around legal definitions, ar-
guing that the federal sex trafficking statutes did not implicate buyers as sex traf-
fickers, and sought an acquittal based on this argument. Separate juries found the 
men guilty of attempted commercial sex trafficking.  
Despite the juries’ guilty verdicts, later in the same year, district courts acquit-
ted the men under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, page 29 (Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 29), which stipulates that an acquittal is required in cases with insufficient evi-
dence. Essentially, the decisions of the district courts in both cases revolved around 
definitional issues. The question was the intent of congress when defining a “sex 
trafficker” under the federal statutes. The district courts who acquitted the two 
men interpreted § 1591 to mean that Congress did not intend for a buyer to be in-
cluded in the definition of a sex trafficker, with the district court in the Jungers 
case stating, “the purpose of § 1591 is to punish sex traffickers and that Congress 
did not intend to expand the field of those prosecuted under that statute to those 
who purchase sex made available by traffickers” (United States v. Jungers, 2013). 
The district court in the Bonestroo case indicated “[a]lthough a bare reading of at 
least one of these three verbs [recruits, entices, and obtains] may support a deter-
mination that § 1591 was meant to encompass purchasers of sex acts from minors, 
the entire language and design of the statute as a whole indicates that it is meant 
to punish those who are the providers or pimps of children, not the purchasers or 
the johns” (United States v. Bonestroo, 2013). 
In contrast, the United States maintained the language of the statute did not 
exclude buyers, and sought to overturn the acquittals. The U.S. Attorney’s office 
argued that the buyers "caused" the commercial sex act of a minor as the purchas-
ers of sex, under the premise that without the buyer, the commercial sex acts would 
not take place. The language is read and interpreted by the United States as not 
excepting consumers, who fit with the legal criteria spelled out in § 1591. “Who-
ever” can be a pimp or third party, as well as a buyer. “Obtains” applies both to the 
trafficker who obtains a person to supply sex to others for their own profit, but also 
to buyers who obtain a person for the purpose of commercial sex. “Section 
1591(a)(1) makes no distinction between suppliers or purchasers of commercial sex 
acts with children” (United States v. Jungers, 2013).  The eighth circuit appellate 
court reversed the lower courts’ decisions, and reinstated the convictions in both 
cases (U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of South Dakota, 2013). The 8th cir-
cuit court also ruled that all acts indicated in § 1591, including “recruits, entices, 
harbors, transports, provides, obtains, or maintains…,” apply to purchasers of sex. 
Because prior convictions under § 1591 were of those who arranged the sale of sex 
or otherwise had a role in supplying commercialized sex, or buyers who did not 
contest the charge, the decision set precedent for future cases, particularly for the 
language of § 1591 including “whoever,” “obtains,” and “caused.”  
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Subsequent Cases 
Following the rulings of Bonestroo and Jungers, the courts continued to con-
tend with the language of human trafficking legislation, on both the state and fed-
eral levels. Specifically, both the knowledge requirement and the term “obtain” 
were center points of debate. For example, in the cases North Dakota v. Rufus 
(2015), United States v. Cook (2016), and United States v. Wolff (2015), the courts 
reexamined the interpretations highlighted in Bonestroo and Jungers, as well as 
the interpretations of the precedent set by the broad language used in both state 
and federal human trafficking legislation. In the following cases, the buyers were 
charged with human trafficking, and like both Jungers and Bonestroo, the defense 
attempted to challenge the statutory language via the appeals process. 
Knowledge Requirement 
In 2013, Zachary Wolff was arrested for the attempted sex trafficking of a minor 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591 and 1594. Wolff had responded to a Craigslist post 
advertising the availability of a 14 year old girl and 16 year old girl for sex. Unbe-
knownst to Wolff, the posting was part of an undercover sting operation conducted 
by law enforcement. Wolff negotiated a price to have sex with the 16 year old, and 
was indicted under the following charge: 
‘On or about November 23, 2013, in the District of North Dakota, Zachary 
Wolff knowingly attempted to recruit, entice, harbor, transport, provide, 
obtain, and maintain by any means, in and affecting interstate or foreign 
commerce, a minor female, whom he believed to be 16 years of age, know-
ing and in reckless disregard of the fact that the female minor had not at-
tained the age of 18 years and that the female minor would be caused to 
engage in a commercial sex act…’ (United States v. Wolf, 2015). 
Wolff appealed his sentence arguing that because the minor did not exist, he 
did not meet the requirement of “knowingly,” specifically, knowingly engaging in 
a commercial sex act with a minor who has not yet attained the age of 18.  
Because of Wolff’s challenge, the 8th Circuit court of appeals had to reexamine 
the requisite mens rea of “knowingly” in those situations when the actual minor 
did not exist. In other words, can the buyer knowingly engage in a commercial sex 
act with a minor if there is no minor involved? In examining the evidence, the court 
ruled that the knowledge requirement “‘refers to the defendant’s subjective in-
tent—it is what is in the mind of the defendant’” (ibid.) Additionally, the court ar-
gued that “if ‘a jury could reasonably infer that [the defendant] knowingly sought 
sexual activity, and knowingly sought it with a minor,’ then the fact that ‘he was 
mistaken in his knowledge is irrelevant’” (ibid.). The court referred to the binding 
precedent of United States v. Jungers and held that “§1591 applies to a purchaser 
of commercial sex acts who violates the statute’s terms” (ibid.). Therefore, despite 
the lack of existence of a minor, Wolff’s act, combined with his subjective intent, 
were sufficient for the court to find he violated the statute. The appellate court af-
firmed Wolff’s indictment of attempted sex trafficking of a minor, using the case 
history and precedent provided by United States v. Jungers. Further, this case sets 
precedent in subsequent cases involving sting operations without a “real” victim 
present, as prior cases did not contest the charge using this defense. Such case 
precedent creates continued support for sting operations using decoys, undercover 
officers, or other means in which a real victim is not present, and resulting prose-
cution of buyers. 
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“Obtains”  
In 2014, Galen Paul Rufus responded to a Craigslist post in which an under-
cover police officer was posing as “Chad Russo.” Mr. “Russo” indicated in the ad-
vertisement that “his girlfriend would be out of town for the weekend and that her 
daughter wanted to make some money” (North Dakota v. Rufus, 2015). “Russo” 
told Rufus that the girl was only fourteen and that a sexual encounter would be 
illegal, but “indicated he would not tell anyone” (ibid.). Rufus agreed to exchange 
“two bags of marijuana, each worth $60, for one hour of time with the fourteen-
year-old girl…” (ibid.). Upon meeting the undercover officer in person, Rufus was 
charged with human trafficking. 
Rufus appealed the conviction that resulted from a state bench trial (meaning 
the judge heard the case personally without a jury and found the defendant guilty) 
based on the term “obtaining.” Rufus argued that he “did not attempt to obtain a 
fourteen year-old-girl, but rather attempted to obtain sexual services from a four-
teen-year old girl. As such, Rufus [argued] his conduct does not constitute ‘obtain-
ing’ a person” (ibid.).  The appellate court referred to United States v. Bonestroo 
and United States v. Jungers because of the similarity in the facts of these cases to 
the facts of North Dakota v. Rufus. Bonestroo had agreed to pay $200 to be alone 
in a separate room with the minors, and the jury found that this constituted an 
attempt to obtain the minors. Rufus sought to engage in sexual acts with a minor 
in a separate room from Russo, thereby the court concluded that “Rufus attempted 
to acquire temporary custody of a fourteen-year-old girl for the purpose of engag-
ing in commercial sexual acts” (ibid.). 
Further, because the word “obtain” is not specifically defined by the statute, 
the court determined that it was appropriate to look at the standard meaning de-
rived from Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, which defines obtain as “‘to 
hold onto, possess’ or ‘to gain or attain…by planned action or effort’” (ibid). Con-
sistent with the ruling in United States v. Jungers, the court concluded that the 
“plain meaning of ‘obtain’…is broad enough to encompass acquiring temporary 
custody of the person for the purpose of engaging in commercial sex acts with that 
person” (ibid.). Rufus was found guilty of “human trafficking for attempting to ob-
tain a fourteen-year-old girl knowing she would be subject to human trafficking” 
(ibid.). The case provides additional case history in interpreting the meaning of 
“obtains” in the statute. It establishes precedent for future cases addressing a sim-
ilar issue, and also further provides a foundation for such cases by citing past prec-
edent (e.g., United States v. Bonestroo). Further, this was a state case that was not 
bound to the 8th Circuit court rulings; rather, the courts used United States v. 
Bonestroo as persuasive precedent, showing that state prosecutors are using case 
precedent from federal cases although they are not legally bound to do so. 
“Anything of Value” 
In United States v. Cook, Cook was a buyer charged by the federal district court, 
in the Western district of Missouri, with sex trafficking. Cook was watching live-
stream videos of sexual torture of a 16-year-old girl provided by Edward and Mar-
ilyn Bagley, who were also charged with sex trafficking. In addition to watching the 
videos filmed by the Bagleys, Cook was also conducting sexual torture of women in 
his residence, and similarly providing pictures, videos, and advice to the Bagleys. 
Cook later came repeatedly to the Bagleys’ residence to engage in sexual torture of 
the victim. In his motion to dismiss the sex trafficking charge(s), he argued that 18 
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U.S.C. § 1591 was unconstitutionally vague in regard to those who purchase sex, 
and should not apply to buyers, similar to the claims of both Jungers and 
Bonestroo. The 8th Circuit court of appeals cited binding case precedent estab-
lished by United States v. Jungers to indicate the plain speech did not exempt buy-
ers. “As we find section 1591(a)(2)'s plain language makes clear that Congress in-
tended to include purchasers of commercial sex acts who violate the statute's 
terms, this argument fails. See Jungers, 702 F.3d at 1069” (United States v. Cook, 
2016).   
Cook further indicated that the phrase “anything of value” was vague and 
therefore inapplicable to his case, and only applicable to traffickers who receive 
payment. The courts disagreed, indicating that the sexual acts, videos, and photos 
were things of value and as such, the motion to dismiss the charges was denied. 
Ostensibly, this case potentially sets precedent to charge buyers of pornography 
with sex trafficking in cases involving minors or trafficked adults, as “anything of 
value” was interpreted to include videos and photos.   
In sum, subsequent cases were impacted by the case precedent set by United 
States v. Jungers and United States v. Bonestroo and provide additional case prec-
edent in contesting various aspects of legislative language, such as a “anything of 
value, “obtains,” and “knowingly.” In addition, the JVTA of 2015 added amend-
ments to section 1591, which include the acts “solicits, advertises and patronizes” 
to show that Congress intended to make it unequivocally clear that buyers can be 
prosecuted as traffickers of minors. The outcome of United States v. Jungers and 
United States v. Bonestroo clearly set precedent for future cases, as indicated in 
the abovementioned examples, and the continued momentum in prosecuting buy-
ers as traffickers further solidifies the role of U.S. legal systems in end-demand 
efforts. Yet, there are further considerations to doing so, including the implications 
of the case precedent for buyers in cases involving adults, labor-trafficked people, 
and minors on a state level. Such considerations are detailed in the following sec-
tions.  
Implications for State Level Prosecution of Buyers  
The implication of the decisions in United States v. Jungers and United States 
v. Bonestroo for prosecuting buyers of commercial sex with minors seems rela-
tively clear. This case history precedent increases the likelihood that federal pros-
ecutors will continue to prosecute buyers as sex traffickers. Yet, as exemplified in 
North Dakota v. Rufus, described above, the decision also holds implications for 
state level prosecution. As Vardaman & Raino (2013, p.1) noted:  
“These decisions [Jungers and Bonestroo] will, in turn, bring support to 
the enforcement of state human trafficking laws in twenty-four states that 
track the “obtains” language of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a). Thus, the Eighth Cir-
cuit’s ruling that interprets “whoever obtains a person knowing that the 
person has not attained the age of 18 years and will be caused to engage in 
a commercial sex act” as including buyers of sex acts with a minor has dra-
matically strengthened the ability to combat demand under both federal 
and state law” (Vardaman & Raino, 2013, p.1).   
Thus, interpretations of the language can impact state level prosecution as well, 
for those states whose laws hold language parallel to the federal legislation or for 
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state prosecutors who wish to use the cases as persuasive precedent. 1 In fact, since 
the decision, state prosecutions have increased from "dozens" to "hundreds," indi-
cated somewhat ambiguously by the U.S. Department of State, although it is un-
clear if this is a direct result of the court decision or due to other factors, such as 
increased familiarity with the law, better identification due to training and aware-
ness of local law enforcement and social service providers, or perhaps a combina-
tion of factors (U.S. Department of State Anti-Trafficking Report, 2012, 2014). The 
proportion of prosecuted cases in which the trafficker is the buyer is also unclear. 
Regardless, the outcome potentially legally legitimizes federal and state-level 
charges of sex trafficking for those who buy sex in interpretations of 1) "causes," as 
purchasing/trading, 2) "whoever" as including buyers, 3) "obtains" in making pri-
vate arrangements for sex with a minor as a buyer, and 4) a “thing of value” as 
including photos and videos.  
At the same time, state level law may hold limitations, both in the age of con-
sent, which can be as young as 14, and in state level definitions. “Some state anti-
trafficking laws fail to follow the TVPRA’s definition of child sex trafficking and, 
instead, presume that a child consents to prostitution unless the presumption is 
rebutted by proof of force, fraud, or coercion” (Butler, 2014, p. 870). Thus, alt-
hough holding implications for the prosecution of buyers of commercial sex with 
minors on a federal level and in some states, implications are limited on a state 
level, depending on state level law in terms of the age of consent, and the inclusion 
of the language of “obtains”, “causes” and “whoever.”  Such dynamics indicate the 
need for legislative shifts to define all minors under the age of 18 involved in com-
mercial sex as victims rather than criminals. In addition, uniformity of the lan-
guage used in state level law with federal law would also impact the utility of case 
precedent. Legislative advocacy in passing Safe Harbor laws, which typically aim 
to decriminalize minors who experience sex trafficking and to increase punish-
ments for buyers, is a current form of activism working to address these barriers 
to prosecuting buyers as sex traffickers on a state level. Although Jungers and 
Bonestroo hold implications for state-level prosecution of buyers of commercial 
sex with minors, particularly in states whose state-level statutes parallel the federal 
statutes, implications for cases involving sex trafficked adults remains under ana-
lyzed.  
Implications for Prosecuting Buyers in Sex Trafficking Cases Involving Adults 
Case precedent may hold implications for the buyers of sex trafficked adults as 
well as sex trafficked minors. Although the cases of Jungers and Bonestroo involve 
minors, and subsequent prosecutions of buyers have involved minors, the inter-
pretation of the language of the statute does not delineate any distinction between 
buyers of trafficked minors compared to trafficked adults. Specifically, interpreta-
tions of “whoever,” “obtains,” and “causes” are not distinguished by age and are 
consequently applicable to cases involving sex trafficked adults.  “Whoever” impli-
cates buyers as sex traffickers in cases involving adults as well as minors. The buyer 
                                                        
1 Although states will often take federal law into consideration, especially when the issues are simi-
lar, they are not required to do so save certain exceptions, thus the precedent of Jungers and 
Bonestroo would be persuasive rather than binding in state level prosecution. Similarly, outside of 
the 8th circuit court, the precedent is also persuasive rather than binding. Accordingly, the Jungers 
and Bonestroo decisions have binding authority in the 8th Circuit, and carry persuasive precedent 
beyond the federal courts in the 8th Circuit.  
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“causes” the sex trafficking by purchasing sex, and “obtains” an adult by seeking 
temporary custody. Thus, case precedent established by the Bonestroo and 
Jungers cases, in interpretations of various language forms, is applicable to cases 
involving adults as well.   
However, there are some differences in the language in the federal statute with 
regard to adults and minors. Specifically, the part of the statute indicating, “or that 
the person has not attained the age of 18 years and will be caused to engage in a 
commercial sex act, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b)” clearly only 
implicates buyers of minors. Yet, the language relating to adults may implicate the 
prosecution of buyers as well, albeit in a different way, stating “knowing, or in reck-
less disregard of the fact, that means of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion de-
scribed in subsection (e)(2), or any combination of such means will be used to 
cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act…shall be punished as provided 
in subsection (b).” Key terms of this portion of the statute include “knowing” and 
“reckless disregard.” The language of intent is subject to analysis, as both “reckless” 
and “knowingly” are dependent upon interpretation. Reckless conduct has been 
outlined by the Model Penal Code2 as:  
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense 
when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that 
the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must 
be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of 
the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard in-
volves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding 
person would observe in the actor's situation. (§2.02).  
 In other words, it must be proven that the buyer consciously disregarded the 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that force, fraud, or coercion may be present. For 
example, a buyer may be conscious that there is the risk that the individual from 
whom they are purchasing sex may be a victim of force, fraud, or coercion, yet 
chooses to engage in the sex act and ignore the risk. This could be interpreted as 
"reckless." However, reckless disregard may be difficult to prove in a court of law, 
as particularly without case precedent, a defendant's prior general knowledge of sex 
trafficking would be challenging to prove. 
The same can be said for the language of "knowingly." The Model Penal Code 
defines the intent of knowing as: 
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense 
when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant 
circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such 
circumstances exist; and (ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, 
he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a 
result (ibid.). 
For the “knowing” intent, it is sufficient that the individual is aware that there 
is a high probability that the person from whom they are purchasing a commercial 
                                                        
2 The Model Penal Code has been adopted in a few states and provisions of it have been adopted in 
many states, but the federal court system has not specifically adopted the Model Penal Code--alt-
hough they sometimes cite or use the MPC, it is not required law. However, the terms knowingly and 
reckless disregard are types of legal intent; the definitions of the intents are fairly universal. 
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sex act is a trafficked individual. They may not have the specific intent to purchase 
sex from a trafficked individual, but they are aware that there is a strong possibility 
that the individual is a victim of trafficking, or has been compelled by force, fraud, 
or coercion. Similar to interpretations of "reckless," showing prior knowledge in 
relationship to intent may be challenging. Reckless disregard was not necessary in 
the Jungers and Bonestroo cases, as the language relating to minors does not in-
clude it. In terms of “knowingly,” the officers had evidence that the men knew they 
were purchasing sex from underage girls, as the undercover officers clearly and 
purposefully disclosed this information to them. In cases involving adults, sting 
operations would need to follow this model and incorporate elements of “knowing” 
intent or “reckless” conduct, clearly establishing the elements of force, fraud, or 
coercion to the buyer in order to garner a successful prosecution. Perhaps more 
useful, force, fraud or coercion are elements that have been used to prosecute 3rd 
party traffickers (such as pimps, brothel owners, etc.) in cases involving adults, but 
could be used to prosecute buyers as well in cases where sufficient evidence exists 
of a buyer’s prior knowledge that force, fraud, or coercion were involved. For ex-
ample, in the case of United States v. Cook, described above, there was sufficient 
evidence of Cook’s prior knowledge of force and coercion. This case involved a six-
teen-year-old victim; however, in a similar case involving an adult, a buyer could 
also be prosecuted as a trafficker, with evidence of meeting the knowledge require-
ment. Like the movement to charge buyers with sex trafficking in cases involving 
minors, charging buyers in cases involving adults who experience force, fraud or 
coercion with sex trafficking is implicated by these prior cases.  
There is an important case relevant to the prosecution of buyers who purchase 
sex from trafficked adults.  In United States v. Afyare, the higher court challenged 
the decision of the district court which stated that 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1) only ap-
plied to minors. The district court made this decision, citing that the title of the 
statute “Sex Trafficking of Children or by Force, Fraud, or Coercion,” indicated 
only children were implicated in the statute. The district court also cited that the 
language in the statute did not specifically state “18 years or older”, and that the 
punishment provision of § 1591(b) only applied to cases involving children.  The 
district court also cited several prior cases and a law review article indicating the 
statute only applied to minors. In United States v. Afyare, the higher court found 
that the district court erred in its decision. First, the plain language clearly states 
in the title of the statute “Sex Trafficking of Children or by Force, Fraud, or Coer-
cion,” emphasizing the word “or.” Second, as indicated previously in this article, 
the decision highlights use of the word “or” in the language of the statute itself, “in 
reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion 
. . . or any combination of such means will be used to cause the person to engage 
in a commercial sex act, or that the person has not attained the age of 18 years and 
will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act…” This clearly indicates inclusion 
of those 18 years or older. Third, the punishment provision in § 1591(b) states “‘if 
the offense was effected by force, fraud, or coercion’ the defendant is to be sen-
tenced to a mandatory 15-year minimum prison term” (United States v. Afyare, 
2016).  Thus, interpretation of plain language does not except cases involving 
adults.  Fourth, the cases and the law review article cited by the district court were 
critiqued by the United States because: “none of those cases analyzes that issue 
[prosecution of buyers involving adults] directly, or even tangentially,” and the law 
review article actually clearly indicated force, fraud, or coercion were required to 
be proven in cases involving adults (ibid.).  Further, the TVPA clearly indicates sex 
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trafficking of adults, using criteria of force, fraud, or coercion, and several subse-
quent cases offer the same reading (e.g., United States v. Mack, 2014; United 
States v. Jackson, 2015).  The “plain language” of § 1591(a) indicates sex trafficking 
of adults by force, fraud, or coercion as well. Thus, the higher court reversed the 
district court’s decision that § 1591 only applies to sex trafficking of children, citing 
the misinterpretation of plain language. Accordingly, the decision in United States 
v. Afyare, indicating that § 1591(a) applies to adults who experience force fraud or 
coercion, read in conjunction with the language interpretations in United States v. 
Jungers and United States v. Bonestroo, indicating that buyers can be traffickers, 
implicates prosecuting buyers as traffickers in cases involving adults. Similar to 
the prosecution of buyers in cases involving sex trafficked adults, the implications 
of United States v. Jungers and United States v. Bonestroo for charging buyers of 
trafficked labor is subject to interpretation as well.  
Implications for Prosecuting Buyers in Labor Trafficking Cases 
Based on the various interpretations of the language set forth under §1591, the 
question arises that if buyers are prosecuted as traffickers, what does that mean 
for other types of human trafficking, such as labor trafficking? 18 U.S.C. §§1589-
1590 address labor trafficking. §1589 states, 
Whoever knowingly provides or obtains the labor or services of a person--
(1) by threats of serious harm to, or physical restraint against, that person 
or another person;(2) by means of any scheme, plan, or pattern intended 
to cause the person to believe that, if the person did not perform such labor 
or services, that person or another person would suffer serious harm or 
physical restraint; or (3) by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of law 
or the legal process, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more 
than 20 years, or both.  
Further, 18 U.S.C. § 1590 states, “Whoever knowingly recruits, harbors, trans-
ports, provides, or obtains by any means, any person for labor or services in viola-
tion of this chapter shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 
years, or both.”  
The interpretations of 18 U.S.C. §1591 indicated in the abovementioned cases 
involving the language of “whoever” and “obtains” provide case history and prece-
dent that can be applied to labor trafficking cases. If “whoever” is interpreted to 
include buyers of sex, then “whoever” can also be interpreted to include buyers of 
trafficked labor. Similarly, if “obtains” is interpreted to include “obtaining” a per-
son for commercial sex, then “obtaining’ a person to perform trafficked labor can 
be similarly interpreted. In North Dakota v. Rufus, the “plain meaning of ‘ob-
tain’…is broad enough to encompass acquiring temporary custody of the person.” 
This interpretation provides a case history that can be utilized in labor trafficking 
cases as well.   
Yet, in terms of “knowingly” it is much more difficult to directly connect the 
buyer to goods made from trafficked labor compared to the direct connection in-
volving a buyer purchasing sex. Rather than discussing the possibility of prosecut-
ing individuals that purchase items directly related to labor trafficking, such as 
produce or clothing, it makes more sense to address the demand side of labor traf-
ficking by focusing on the corporations and farmers that benefit from trafficked 
and exploited labor through civil and criminal liability. 
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Perhaps the greatest problem in labor trafficking cases is that the corporations 
and farmers are generally not held accountable for what happens through the var-
ious avenues of production. As Heil noted in her research of agricultural labor traf-
ficking, “…the problem is not being able to prosecute the actual growers due to the 
line of ignorance that is created between the grower, and the pit-bosses and con-
tractors. As growers continue to deny any knowledge of what their field bosses are 
doing…, they claim they have no responsibility and therefore cannot be prose-
cuted” (2012, p. 127). Similarly, Heil & Nichols (2015) found that farmers were 
purchasing labor from crew leaders, who engaged in acts of fraud to provide inex-
pensive labor to farmers. Yet, the farmers claimed ignorance of such factors. Many 
corporations use third parties to recruit employees, and this “further exacerbates 
the problem and allows employers to function with de facto impunity” (USAID, 
2011, p. 33). These third-party subcontractors “rely on workers’ ignorance of local 
labor laws, wages and benefits and [in cases of undocumented workers] exploit 
their fear of deportation” (ibid.). They may also use force or the threat of force to 
maintain custody of the workers and their labor. 
One avenue of addressing the use of subcontractors in labor trafficking cases is 
to hold corporations and farmers that benefit from labor trafficking civilly liable. 
For example, in 2005, Wal-Mart Stores Inc. was identified as having approximately 
250 undocumented workers employed as janitorial workers in 21 stores across the 
United States since 1998. According to Hawke, “many of the janitors—from Mex-
ico, Russia, Mongolia, Poland, and a host of other nations—worked seven days or 
nights a week without overtime pay or injury compensation…Those who worked 
nights were often locked in the stores until the morning” (Hawke, 2005). The retail 
giant worked with janitorial subcontracting companies that hired and exploited the 
undocumented workers. Walmart denied any wrongdoings, “claiming only to have 
provided insufficient oversight…Walmart and the U.S. Government agreed to $11 
million settlement” (USAID, 2011, p. 34). Financial penalties such as this have mo-
tivated Walmart and other corporations worldwide (e.g. the United States Defense 
Departments contractor, KBR who was ordered to pay $1 million to Nepalese vic-
tims of labor trafficking) to monitor more closely “their supply chains in order to 
reduce the demand for trafficked labor” (ibid., p. 36). 
Another way to address the lack of corporations monitoring their supply chains 
is by using the already existing corporate liability laws in the United States, which 
state: 
Criminal liability is imposed in those instances that the criminal conduct 
is authorized, requested, commanded, performed, or recklessly tolerated 
…by a high managerial official acting on behalf of the corporation within 
the scope of his or her office or employment (Model Penal Code, Section 
2.07) 
Although this law was written with the safety of consumers in mind, the lan-
guage clearly places liability upon those who condone illegal behavior, including 
those who may not actually carry out the criminal activity. With the already exist-
ing language of corporate liability, along with interpretations of 18 U.S.C. §1591 in 
the abovementioned cases, 18 U.S.C. §§1589-1590 can easily be interpreted to in-
clude the corporations as traffickers. Currently, corporations claim that they are 
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unaware of who is being hired to work through the supply chain. Yet, if the lan-
guage of the corporate liability statute is read in conjunction with §1589, corpora-
tions could potentially be regarded as traffickers. The corporation may not “know-
ingly provide or obtain” the workers, but the trafficking is recklessly tolerated (i.e. 
there is awareness of the risk of trafficking but the risk is disregarded). In addition, 
drawing from the case history of United States v. Jungers and United States v. 
Bonestroo, interpretations of the language of “knowingly” may also be utilized in 
labor trafficking cases. Further, the corporation does benefit financially “from par-
ticipation in a venture which has engaged in an act” in which a person has been 
provided, obtained, etc. Thus, as the definition of “trafficker” continues to legally 
be interpreted, hiding behind the cloak of ignorance or lack of oversight may no 
longer be tolerated. Perhaps if criminal liability were to be imposed on the corpo-
rations, with charges under both §1589 and the corporate liability law, they would 
be more likely to pay attention to who the crew leaders were hiring, as well as mon-
itor the work and pay conditions of the laborers. Although corporations could 
claim ignorance, corporate liability could still be imposed. The corporations should 
also be considered traffickers in that they benefit financially, and they are reckless 
in disregarding the potential of trafficking occurring in their fields. They also may 
be conscious of the risk that trafficking circumstances exist, but choose to disre-
gard them. Thus, in terms of policy, new statutes do not need to be written in order 
to hold corporations liable. Rather, extending the interpretation of existing stat-
utes to address labor trafficking is called for. 
Conclusion and Limitations 
In conclusion, as evidenced in subsequent cases, United States v. Jungers and 
United States v. Bonestroo clearly show important implications for prosecuting 
buyers as sex traffickers involving minors on a federal and state level. At the same 
time, the implications of these cases for sex trafficked adults and labor trafficked 
people have remained marginalized in justice system responses as well as in the 
academic discourse. Thus, the authors recommend utilizing case history to apply 
to subsequent cases involving adults who experience sex trafficking, as well as la-
bor trafficking. Specifically, the interpretations of “obtains,” “whoever” and a 
“thing of value” in prior cases provides precedent that is applicable to labor traf-
ficking and cases involving trafficked adults.  In addition, similar to cases involving 
minors, knowing intent can be established in cases involving adults, but focused 
on the language of force, fraud and coercion rather than age. Buyers could be 
charged as sex traffickers in cases involving adults in which there is evidence to 
show prior knowledge of force, fraud, and coercion. In terms of labor trafficking, 
applying the relevant language interpretations under section 1591 to charges under 
18 U.S.C. §§1589-1590 combined with corporate liability law may be useful in pros-
ecuting third party buyers of trafficked labor, such as corporations and farmers 
buying labor through pit bosses, crew leaders, or other recruiters.  
The aim of this article was to provide a case analysis to discuss implications for 
prosecuting buyers through state level prosecution, as well as cases involving traf-
ficked adults and trafficked labor. The article does not support or evaluate the ef-
ficacy of end-demand approaches through prosecution. In fact, the benefits and 
challenges of demand reduction through justice system responses remain conten-
tiously debated. Critiques of end-demand efforts include lack of attention to ad-
dressing the root causes of trafficking (such as poverty, homelessness, child abuse 
13
Nichols and Heil: Prosecuting Buyers in Human Trafficking Cases
Published by DigitalCommons@URI, 2017
  
and neglect in the home, lack of social safety nets, etc.), diversion of resource allo-
cation away from social services and survivors of human trafficking to criminal 
justice system responses, lack of inclusivity of labor trafficking, and the potential 
for increased criminalization and risk to those in the commercial sex industry more 
broadly, including trafficked people (Freedom Network USA, 2015). It is the view 
of the authors that the goals, choices, safety and needs of survivors should always 
be the first priority. End-demand efforts that do not include these considerations 
will be limited in their utility, and may inadvertently cause harm (see Musto, 2016 
and Lutnick, 2016 for an overview). Consequently, the authors caution that this 
article should not be viewed as support for end-demand efforts in all forms, rather, 
as an overview of related cases, their implications, and the ways prosecutors can 
use case history precedent in already established cases of human trafficking, and 
in cases in which survivors want to prosecute.  
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